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THE PROBLEM OF INDEMNITY UNDER
THE SAFE PLACE STATUTE
ROBERT
I.

F. BODEN*

INTRODUCTORY

A great number of cases which have arisen under the Wisconsin
Safe Place Statute have concerned not only the rights as between
the injured party and a single defendant, but the conflicting rights
and duties of several persons charged with liability under the Statute.
In many of the cases involving injuries sustained under circumstances
such that the Safe Place Statute is applicable, it is necessary not only
to resolve the question of whether or not the plaintiff may recover,
but further the ofttimes most difficult question of who shall ultimately
bear the loss.
The Safe Place Statute was drafted in such way that more than
one person may bear the necessary relationship to the injured plaintiff entitling plaintiff to recover from him. Indeed, there may be cases
where the plaintiff has a cause of action against numerous parties as
a result of his injuries.
Subcontractors, general contractors, owners, lessees, architects,
employers-all are persons who may or may not sustain liability
under the Safe Place Statute, depending upon the facts of each case.
It is the purpose of this article to explore and attempt to resolve the
legal problems concerned with the relationship between these various
classes of persons with the objective in view of trying to determine
who shall ultimately be responsible for the injuries to a given plaintiff.
II.

NATURE OF THE SAFE PLACE STATUTE AND LIABILITY
THEREUNDER

A. IN GENERAL
The Wisconsin Safe Place Statute is a most unusual piece of
legislation. It has been on the statute books since 1911,' and has been
the subject of extended litigation over the years.
* LL.B., Marquette University, 1952, Member of Wisconsin Bar; Editor-in-Chief

Marquette Law Review, 1951-52; Associate in firm of Quarles, Spence &
Quarles, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1952-56; presently partner in firm of Boden &
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1 Wis. LAWS, (1911), Ch. 485.
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The duty imposed by the Statute is set forth in Section 101.06 of
the WISCONSIN STATUTES providing as follows:
"Every empolyer shall furnish employment which shall be
safe for the employes therein and shall furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for employes therein and for frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use safety devices and
safeguards, and shall adopt and use methods and processes
reasonably adequate to render such employment and places of
employment safe, and shall do every other thing reasonably
necessary to protect the life, health, safety, and welfare of such
employes and frequenters. Every employer and every owner of
a place of employment or a public building now or hereafter
constructed shall so construct, repair or maintain such place of
employment or public building, and every architect shall so
prepare the plans for the construction of such place of employment or public building, as to render the same safe."
Section 101.01, quoted in its entirety in the footnotes, 2 defines the
various terms used in establishing the duty prescribed by Section
101.06.
2

"101.01 Definitions of terms used. The following terms as used in Sections
101.01 to 101.29 of the statutes, shall be construed as follows:
(1) The phrase 'place of employment' shall mean and include every place,
whether indoors or out or underground and the premise appurtenant thereto
where either temporarily or permanently any industry, trade or business is
carried on, or where any process or operation, directly or indirectly related to
any industry, trade or business, is carried on, and where any person is, directly
or indirectly, employed by another for direct or indirect gain or profit, but shall
not include any place where persons are employed in (a) private domestic service which does not involve the use of mechanical power or (b) farm labor
when the employer is the farmer operating the farm and the labor is such as is
customarily performed as a part of farming, and including the transportation
of farm products immediately and directly from the farm, and of materials,
supplies or equipment directly to the farm for use thereon.
(2)
The term 'employment' shall mean and include any trade, occupation or
process of manufacture or any method of carrying on such trade, occupation
or process of manufacture in which any person may be engaged, except in
such private domestic service as does not include the use of mechanical power
and in farm labor as used in subsection (1).
(3) The term 'employer' shall mean and include every person, firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, village, school district, sewer district, drainage
district and other public or quasi-public corporations as well as any agent,
manager, representative or other person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or of any employe.
(4) The term 'employe' shall mean and include every person who may be required or directed by any employer, in consideration of direct or indirect gain
or profit, to engage in any employment, or to go or work or be at any time in
any place of employment.
(5)
The term 'frequenter' shall mean and include every person, other than an
employe, who may go in or be in a place of employment or public building
under circumstances which render him other than a trespasser.
(6) The term 'deputy' shall mean and include any person employed by the
industrial commission designated as such deputy by the commission, who shall
possess special, technical, scientific, managerial or personal abilities or qualities
in matters within the jurisdiction of the industrial commission, and who may
be engaged in the performance of duties under the direction of the commission, calling for the exercise of such abilities or qualities.
(7) The term 'order' shall mean and include any decision, rule, regulation,
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In construing the Statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held
that it creates no new causes of action in favor of anyone or against
anyone but that it only affects the duty and defines the standard of
care owed by owners and employers toward frequenters and employees
in public buildings and places of employment.'
In Rosholt v. Worden-Allen Co.,4 the Court held that the Safe
Place Statute, requiring every employer to furnish a place of employment which shall be as free from danger "as the nature of the employment will reasonably permit" effected a radical change from the
common law rule which required only that the place should be reasonably safe. The Court held that the duty imposed by the Statute is an
absolute one and is a greater duty than the duty merely to operate the
place in a non-negligent manner.5
direction, requirement or standard of the commission, or any other determination arrived at or decision made by such commission.
(8) The term 'general order' shall mean and include such order as applies
generally throughout the state to all persons, employment, places of employment or public buildings, or all persons, employments, or places of employment
or public buildings of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All
other orders of the commission shall be considered special orders.
(9) The term 'local order' shall mean and include any ordinance, order, rule
or determination of any common council, board of aldermen, board of trustees,
or the village board, or any village or city, or the board of health of any municipality, or an order or direction of any official of such municipality, upon
any matter over which the industrial commission has jurisdiction.
(10) The term 'welfare' shall mean and include comfort, decency and moral
well-being.
(11) The term 'safe' or 'safety' as applied to an employment or a place of
employment or a public building, shall mean such freedom from danger to the
life, health, safety or welfare of employes or frequenters, or the public, or
tenants, or firemen, and such reasonable means of notification, egress and escape in case of fire, and such freedom from danger to adjacent buildings or
other property, as the nature of the employment, place of employment, or public
building, will reasonably permit.
(12) The term 'public building' as used in sections 101.01 to 101.29 shall mean
and include any structure used in whole or in part as a place of resort, assemblage, lodging, trade, traffic, occupancy, or use by the public, or by three or more
tenants.
(13) The term 'owner' shall mean and include every person, firm, corporation,
state, county, town, city, village, school district, sewer district, drainage district and other public or quasi-public corporations as well as any manager, representative, officer, or other person having ownership, control or custody of
any place of employment or public building, or of the construction, repair or
maintenance of any place of employment or public building, or who prepares
plans for the construction of any place of employment or public building. Said
sections 101.01 to 101.29, inclusive, shall apply, so far as consistent, to all architects and builders."
3 Mullen v. Larson-Morgan Co., 212 Wis. 52, 249 N.W. 67 (1933) ; Holzworth v.
State, 238 Wis. 63, 298 N.W. 163 (1941).
4 155 Wis. 168, 144 N.W. 650 (1913) ; see also Sparrow v. Menasha Paper Co.,
154 Wis. 459, 143 N.W. 317 (1913); Hollenbeck v. Chippewa Sugar Co., 156
Wis. 317, 144 N.W. 1104 (1914) ; Peschel v. Klug, 170 Wis. 519, 75 N.W. 806
(1920) ; Mullen v. Larson-Morgan Co., supra, note 3.
5 While it is generally conceded that the Safe Place Statute increased the duty
of an owner or employer beyond that prescribed by common law, at least one
author has pointed out that "While our Court has frequently stated that the
duty imposed by the Safe Place Statutes is more stringent, it would take a
metaphysician to describe any relative difference between 'reasonably safe'
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While the Safe Place Statute may not have technically created
any causes of action, nevertheless the construction placed upon it by
the Court over the years has had that practical effect in many instances.
For instance, in Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church6 the Court
held that the Safe Place Statute makes no exceptions of religious and
charitable corporations and that therefore, in enacting it, the legislature abolished, insofar as safe place cases were concerned, the immunity from suit theretofore enjoyed by religious and charitable
corporations.

7

In Heiden v. Milwaukee," it was held that the inclusion of cities
within the term "owner" as defined in the Statute indicated legislative
intent that municipal corporations be subject to it, whether acting in a
proprietary or in a governmental capacity, and that their immunity
from suit in safe place cases arising out of governmental activities was
removed by the Statute.
The Court refused to extend this principle to the state itself in
Holzworth v. State,9 despite the fact that the state was included in
the definition of "owner" in the Statute. The ground for the Court's
refusal to hold that the Safe Place Statute abolished, as to cases within
its purview, the state's immunity from suit was that the Statute created
no causes of action but only set up a standard of care.
Likewise, the Court has held that the Safe Place Statute has abolished the defense of assumption of risk theretofore available in negligence cases. 10
Thus it is seen that the general statement that the Safe Place Statute
only lays down a standard of care must be qualified to the extent that
it abolishes certain defenses historically available at common law. In
that sense, it has created causes of action which did not exist before
its passage.
For purposes of this article, exploring the question of indemnity
under the Statute, it is probably sufficient to classify the Safe Place
Statute as one defining standard of care rather than as one creating
causes of action, bearing in mind these general exceptions to the rule.
It is also to be noted in connection with the Safe Place Statute
that its application is confined, at least under present interpretation, to
cases of defects in the premises involved and not to acts of active negliand 'as safe as the (premises') nature reasonably permits'." Reuss, Thirty
Years of the Safe Place Statute, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 333, 334.
c 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930).
7 See also Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital, 265 Wis. 502, 61 N.W.2d 900 (1953).
8226 Wis. 92, 275 N.W. 922 (1937).
9 Supra, note 3.
10 Washburn v. Skogg, 204 Wis. 29, 233 N.W. 764; 235 N.W. 437 (1931) ; Bent v.
Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N.W. 290 (1934) ; Sweitzer v. Fox, 226 Wis. 26, 275
N.W. 546 (1937) ; but see Klein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 263 Wis. 317, 57
N.W.2d 188 (1953).

1957]

SAFE PLACE STATUTE

gence by persons on those premises."" In other words, the Safe Place
Statute is not concerned with negligent acts by employees on otherwise safe premises, charged under the doctrine of respondent superior
to the employer or owner, but is concerned with the condition of the
premises. Thus no liability attaches under the Statute where the plaintiff has been injured because of the negligence of some co-employee,
but does attach if he is injured because of the defective condition of
12
the premises.
B.

DUTIES OF OWNERS AND EMPLOYERS UNDER THE STATUTE

The duties imposed by the Safe Place Statute are imposed upon
a definite class of persons. Persons upon whom safe place duties are
imposed are either "owners" or "employers" depending upon the
nature of the premises involved. There may be owners of public
buildings and owners of places of employment. There can be employers
in charge of places of employment and there can be employers in
charge of public buildings, which are also places of employment. In
each case, however, a person must qualify as an owner or employer
before he may be subjected to liability, and his liability may differ
depending upon whether he is owner or employer.
The Statute defines "employer" as follows:13
"The term 'employer' shall mean and include every person,
firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, village, school district, sewer district, drainage district and other public or quasipublic corporations as well as any agent, manager, representative
or other person having control or custody of any employment,
place of employment or of any employe."
The Statute defines "owner" as follows :14

"The term 'owner' shall mean and include every person,
firm, corporation, state, county, town, city, village, school district, sewer district, drainage district and other public or quasipublic corporations as well as any manager, representative,
officer, or other person having ownership, control or custody, of
any place of employment or public building, or of the construction, repair or maintenance of any place of employment
or public building, or who prepares plans for the construction
of any place of employment or public building. Said sections
101.01 to 101.29, inclusive, shall apply, so far as consistent, to
all architects and builders."
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the many legal problems concerned with who are "owners" and who are "employers"
except as those problems bear upon the question at hand. The im11 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 259 Wis. 333, 48 N.W.2d 505 (1951).
12 Ibid.
13 WIs. STATS. (1955), §101.01(3).
14 Wis. STATS. (1955), §101.01(13).
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portant phraseology to keep in mind in connection with the definition
of "owner" is that the owner must be a person "having ownership,
control or custody of any place of employment or public building or
of the construction, repair or maintenance of any place of employment
or public building ... "
It becomes obvious, therefore, that the term "owner" in the Safe
Place Statute is far broader than the concept of ownership as understood in the law of property.
C.

DUTIES OF OWNERS AND EMPLOYERS; NON-DELEGABLE DUTIES

The basis of the entire problem of indemnity under the Safe Place
Statute is the proposition that the duties imposed by the Statute are
non-delegable.15 The leading case on this point is Criswell v.Seaman
Body Corp.16 In that case, Seaman engaged the Permanent Construction Co. as general contractor to erect a building. Permanent subcontracted the erection of structural steel to Worden-Allen Co. The plaintiff was an employee of Worden-Allen. He was injured in the course
of his employment for Worden when a metal cable extending from
a derrick used by Worden's crew came in contact with an uninsulated
wire of a power line owned by the Electric Co. but located on Seaman's premises.
It appeared that Seaman not only had the right to direct the location and height of the power company's poles, but also had several
employees who had charge of inspecting the work being done by
Worden and Permanent, and who did in fact discuss safety matters
with the subcontractor Worden.
After receiving Workmen's Compensation from Worden's compensation carrier, the plaintiff commenced a third party action under
the provisions of Wis.

STATS.,

Sec.

102.29, against Seaman and the

Electric Co. to recover damages for injuries sustained as a result of
violations of the Safe Place Statute by the defendants.1 7 A verdict
15 The proposition that "safe place duties" are non-delegable was recognized early

in the course of the judicial construction of the act. Sparrow v. Menasha Paper
Co., supra, note 4; Waskow v. Robert L. Reisinger Co., 180 Wis. 537, 193 N.W.
358 (1923). In Neitzke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc., 214 Wis. 441, 253 N.W.
579 (1934) the Court said: "The fact, if such be the case, that respondent's
(Plaintiff's) immediate employer was derelict in his duty does not affect the
validity of respondent's claim against appellant (defendant owner), on whom
rested the duty to provide a safe place to work." See also Saxhaug v. Forsyth
Leather Co., 252 Wis. 376, 31 N.W.2d 589 (1947).
16 233 Wis. 606, 290 N.W. 177 (1940).
17 It should be noted that, under the Safe Place Statute, the employee of a contractor working on premises is within the definition of "frequenter" in Wis.
STATS. (1955), §101.01 (5) as to other contractors and employers in and owners
of the premises. Neitzke v. Kraft-Phenix Dairies, supra, note 15; Criswell v.
Seaman Body Corp., supra, note 16; Morrison v. Steinfort, 254 Wis. 89, 35
N.W.2d 335 (1948); Johannsen v. Peter P. Woboril, Inc., 260 Wis. 341, 50
N.W.2d 53 (1952). Such injured employee, then, enjoys the status of "frequenter" when commencing a third party action against one allegedly liable
under the Safe Place Statute, and as to him, as "frequenter," another "em-
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was directed in favor of the Electric Co. but the issue of Seaman's
violation was given to the jury. From judgment on an adverse verdict,
Seaman appealed.
On appeal, Seaman contended that it did not own, maintain or
control the power line, which was owned and cared for by the Electric
Co.; that it was neither engaged in nor equipped for the construction
trade, and let the contract for the erection of the building to Permanent;
that it did not own, control or select the equipment or methods of
Permanent or its subcontractors and could not control the details of
the work.
The Court held that the evidence established conclusively that Seaman was the owner and had custody, control and possession of the
premises upon which the power line and 'building were located. Said
the Court:
"Although the Electric Company continued to be the owner
of the power line, that fact did not prevent Seaman from
exercising its rights and powers of controlling and having
necessary changes made by the Electric Company in the location and height of its poles and wires, and the clearance of the
latter for safety purposes. In these respects and for that purpose, Seaman had sufficient control over the power line upon
its prem ises. .. ..,,8

The Court went on to say:
"... when Seaman let the general contract to Permanent
and it in turn engaged Worden as the subcontractor to erect
the structural steel, Seaman neither relinquished its rights of
possession and control of the premises nor could it while continuing in possession and control thereof delegate to either
Permanent or Worden, so as to absolve itself therefrom, its
duty and obligation under Sec. 101.06, Stats., to furnish for
employees and frequenters the safe place of employment, safety
devices, safeguards and methods and every other thing required by that statute ....

Consequently it was Seaman's duty

under the safe-place statute either to have the wires relocated
so as to remove the danger of a contact or the formation of an
electric arc between the wire and the cable, or to have the current
shut off while the boom had to be operated so close to where the
wires were placed with Seaman's knowledge and consent. Having
knowledge of the dangerous condition and having the right and
power to remedy it Seaman became liable for injuries caused by
its failure to furnish and maintain a safe place of employment
in compliance with Sec. 101.01, Stats." (Emphasis added) 19
The Court also pointed out: "Negligence on the part of Worden
ployer" on the premises owes the same duties as he does to his own employees.
Sandeen v. Willow River Powder Co., 214 Wis. 166, 252 N.W. 706 (1934).
IsSupra, note 16, at p. 617 of 233 Wis.
19 Supra, note 16, at pp. 617-618 of 233 Wis.
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does not defeat Seaman's liability to Criswell as a frequenter by reason
of its failure to comply with the Safe Place Statute."2
Thus, under the Criswell decision, when it is established that a
given party was an "owner" of the premises, liability attaches, and the
obligations incurred under the Statute cannot be delegated. The duty
owed is directly owed to "employees" and "frequenters" and cannot be
avoided as to such persons.
Several important rules of law helping to define "owner" are developed in the Criswell case, bearing, of course, upon the question
of non-delegable duties. They are:
1. The "ownership, control or custody" of a place of employment
or public building need not be exclusive in order to charge one as
"owner."
2. Control and custody may be enough to impose the duties of an
"owner," though ownership is not present in the property sense of
that term.
3. Though a construction job be let to an independent contractor,
who controls the details thereof, the title-holder may retain sufficient
"ownership, control or custody" if he retains a right to inspect the
work, to look after the condition of the premises, and to conduct other
activities on the premises.

4. In order to charge the owner, the defect need not exist before
the work began.
In addition, the Criswell case establishes the important doctrine
that, because an owner's duties are non-delegable, he may sustain
liability under the Statute without actual fault or for his passive negligence, even though a cause of the injuries to the plaintiff is the active
negligence of some other "owner," as, in the Criswell case, a subcontractor.21
An important exception to the Criswell rule, if it can properly be
called an exception, remained dicta only for twenty years, until, in
1955, it was recognized in Potter v. City of Kenosha.2 2 In Neitzke v.
Kraft-Phenix Dairies,Inc., 23 the Court said in dicta:
"Situations may arise where the premises are so changed by
the independent contractor as to excuse the owner from liability.
If, for instance, the dangerous instrumentality is erected by the
independent contractor himself, or a defective scaffolding is installed, the owner may not be liable for the injuries resulting.
Or if the independent contractor conducts his work, unknown
20 Supra, note 16, at p. 619 of 233 Wis.
-qee also, in connection with non-delegable duties and the conditions requisite
to their imposition, Waskow v. Robert L. Reisinger Co., supra, note 15; Bunce
v. Grand & Sixth Bldg., Inc., 206 Wis. 100, 238 N.W. 867 (1931) ; Neitzke v.
Kraft-Phenix Dairies, Inc., supra, note 15; Mickelson v. Cities Service Oil Co.,
250 Wis. 1, 26 N.W.2d 264 (1946).
22268 Wis. 361, 68 N.W.2d 4 (1955).
23 Supra, note 15.
21
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to the owner, in a manner so unusual and at variance with the
customary methods of doing that work that because of it an
existing instrumentality becomes dangerous and renders the
premises unsafe, the owner may be free from liability."
The recent Potter case clearly recognized this principle and said:
"We are constrained to hold that when an owner turns
over to an independent contractor the complete control and
custody of a safe place, whereon or whereunder the contractor
creates a place of employment for the purpose of fulfilling the
terms of the contract, the owner reserving no right of supervision or control of the work excepting that of inspection or to
change the plan with reference to the construction to be furnished, if thereafter in the performance of the work under the
contract the premises are changed by the contractor and as a result a hazardous condition is created, the owner does not become
liable to the contractor's employee injured as a consequence of
such hazardous
condition while acting in the scope of his em24
ployment.
An analysis of the rule indicates that it is but an amplification of
the doctrine of the Criswell case relative to "ownership, custody or
control" and well within the framework of that case.
No attempt will be made to exhaust the many legal problems raised
in considering the different duties owed under the Statute by "owners"
and "employers" for such would serve no useful purpose. Notice must
be taken, at least in general, however, of the distinction between the
statutory duties of "owners" and "employers," since the conflicting
interests of defendants in a safe place case are necessarily affected
thereby.
In Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation,2' the
Court pointed out:
"The employer's duty to furnish safe employment includes
the furnishing of a safe place of employment, and the employer
has a broad duty not only with respect to the structure, which
constitutes the place of employment, but with reference to the
devices and other property installed or placed in such place. The
employer's duty is carefully and specifically set forth in the
first half of the section (Sec. 101.06). The last portion of the
section defines the duty of employers and owners with respect to
the structure of the building. The duty in this respect is to construct, repair and maintain such place of employment or such
building in such a manner as to render the same safe. The obligation of the owner as such plainly relates to the building and
not to temporary conditions which may negligently be permitted
to exist within the building....
"The permitting of temporary conditions wholly dissociated
from the structure does not constitute a violation of the safe
24 Potter v. City of Kenosha, sitpra, note 22, at p. 372 of 268 Wis.
25219 Wis. 209, 262 N.W. 585 (1935).
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place statute by the owner of a building, although, and it obviously does, constitute a violation if permitted by an employer."
However, where the "owner" of a "public building" is also an
"employer" and the building also qualifies as a "place of employment,"
the owner sustains the larger liability of an "employer" not only to
26
employees but to "frequenters" in the building.
The measure of duty, of course, becomes important in an indemnity
case involving an "owner," inasmuch as it is the determination of his
duty as co-extensive with the duty of another, coupled with its nondelegability and the fact that the duty should be discharged by the
other, which confers the cause of action for indemnity.

III.

NATURE

OF

INDEMNITY

As it was necessary to examine the nature of the Safe Place
Statute and the theory of liability thereunder, particularly the concept
of non-delegable duties, so also is it necessary to consider the principles
of the law of indemnity.
In the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, it is said:
"A person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty
which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to
indemnity from the other, unless27 the payor is barred by the
wrongful nature of his conduct."

In commenting upon this rule the

RESTATEMENT

says:

".... it applies where the duty to be performed is contractual
or quasi-contractual where it is a duty owed to the public, as in
the payment of a tax, and where the duty to pay is based upon
a tort, as where a servant innocently commits conversion in obeying orders of his master and has been required to pay damages
therefor. It applies irrespective of the existence of a contract or
agreement between the payor and the primary obligor, although
it is subject
to the terms of any contract which the parties may
28
make."
Thus it appears that a contract of indemnity may be an express
contract or a contract implied in fact or implied in law depending upon
29
the circumstances of the case.
A contract implied in fact, as distinguished from a contract implied
in law, or a "quasi-contract,". "requires the same as an express con26

Prehn v. C. Niss & Sons, Inc., 233 Wis. 155, 288 N.W. 736 (1939).

27

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, §76.
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, §76, Comment B.

28

29 "It has been generally stated that a contract of indemnity need not be express,

but that indemnity may be recovered if the evidence establishes an implied con-

tract. And although a right of indemnity generally arises by contract, express
or implied, it has been said to exist whenever the relation between the parties
is such that either in law or in equity there is an obligation on one party to
indemnify the other, as where one person is exposed to liability by the wrongful act of another in which he does not join." 27 AM. JUR., INDEMNITY, §16.
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tract, the element of mutual meeting of minds and intention to contract.

' 30

Our Court has said:

"The two species (express and implied-in-fact contracts)
differ only in methods of proof. One is established by proof of
intention, the other by proof of circumstances
from which the
intention is implied as a matter of fact." 31
Contracts are implied in fact, then, when services are performed
by one at the request of another; it being from the request that the
intention to contract may be implied.3 2 On the other hand, where
one merely accepts services rendered by another, and valuable to him,
not having requested them, no such intention may be implied, and the
remedy must be in the field of quasi or implied-in-law contracts. 33
A contract implied in law arises because the law, to prevent unjust
enrichment, imposes upon another the obligation to pay a debt which
he, in equity and good conscience, should have paid.34 Such "contracts"
are not really contracts at all for the liability arises by operation of law
without regard to the assent of the parties. As pointed out in the
Wojahn case:
"They (contracts implied in law) arise where there is a
legal duty to respond in money which by a legal fiction may be
enforced as upon an implied promise. In such case there is no
element of contract strictly so called. There is only the duty to
which the law fixes a legal obligation of performance as in the
case of a promise inter partes. So it is called in the books a
quasi-contract."3 5
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recently said in Nelson v.
Preston:36

". .. quasi contracts are 'a class of obligations which are
imposed or created by law without regard to the assent of the
party bound, on the ground that they are dictated by reason and
justice, . . . and the obligation arises not from consent .... but

from the law or natural equity. Such contracts rest on the equitable principle that a person shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another, .

.

. In order that a

contract may be implied in law from the wrong of a party, it
must have been committed with the intention of benefiting his
own estate.' 17 C.J.S. CONTRACTS, p. 323, Sec. 6. As stated in

Dunnebacke Co. v. Pittman, 216 Wis. 305, 257 N.W. 30, the
essential elements of quasi contract entitling one to judgment for
unjust enrichment are:
30

Wojahn v. National Union Bank, 144 Wis. 646, 129 N.W. 1068 (1911).

3"Ibid.
32 Ibid.
3 Wojahn v. National Union Bank,

supra, note 30; Dunnebacke Co. v. Pittman,

216 Wis. 305, 257 N.W. 30 (1934).
34 Supra, notes 27 and 28.
35 Wojahn v. National Union Bank, supra, note 30.
36 262 Wis. 547, 55 N.W.2d 918 (1952).
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1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
2. Appreciation by the defendant of the fact of such benefit;
3. Acceptance and retention by the defendant of such benefit,
under circumstances such that it would be inequitable
to retain the benefit without payment of the value thereof."
A right to indemnity, then, may possibly arise in three ways: by
express contract; by contract implied in fact; or by quasi-contract.
For all practical purposes we may disregard contracts implied in fact,
insofar as indemnity under the Safe Place Statute is concerned, since
it is hardly to be anticipated that one's liability would be discharged
by another at his request, except under the most unusual circumstances.
We shall turn our attention, then, to express and quasi-contracts.
IV.

THE PROBLEM OF INDEMNITY

A. EXPRESS CONTRACTS
The only Wisconsin case discussing the issues arising out of express
indemnity contracts is Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Worden-Allen Co.,

7

a sequel to Criswell v. Seaman Body Corp.,38 dis-

cussed supra. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. was the liability
insurer of the Seaman Company, and, of course, paid the judgment
rendered against Seaman and affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
Criswell case. After paying the judgment, Hartford, subrogated to
the rights of Seaman, commenced an action against Worden-Allen,
the subcontractor whose boom had come into contact with the electric
wires causing Criswell's injuries, to recover the amount paid Criswell
together with the cost of defending the action. The action was commenced upon an express contract of indemnity executed between
Worden and Permanent, the general contractor, for the benefit of
Seaman. 39 Thus the stage was set for the first, and unfortunately the
last, case to come before the Court on the indemnity problem under
the Safe Place Statute.
The Court held that Hartford (standing in the shoes of Seaman)
could recover indemnity under the contract from Worden-Allen. The
contract provision was as follows:
"In accepting this order you (Worden) agree to indemnify,
reimburse and save harmless the owner (Seaman) and us
(Permanent) of and from all loss and damage to person or
property and all claims, suits or demands arising from damages
or injuries to you and your employees, ourselves and our employees, the owner and his employees, other contractors and
37238 Wis. 124, 297 N.W. 436 (1941).
38 Supra, note 16.

39 It should be noted that, at the time that Criswell originally commenced his
action, Seaman tendered the defense of the action to Worden-Allen, which
declined the tender. The importance of this procedural device in an indemnity
case is discussed infra, in connection with other procedural problems.
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their employees, and the general public, due to,
arising from,
' 40
or connected with your operations on this job.
Worden made the following contentions in defense of the action:
1. Seaman (and Hartford) is not entitled to be indemnified under
the contract "for any injuries to which Seaman's actual default proximately contributed ;-41
2. It would be contrary to public policy to give effect to the agreement in that it would encourage Seaman to neglect its safe place
duties;
3. Hartford (Seaman's liability insurer) and Worden were at
most co-sureties and contribution, not indemnity, is the rule to be
42
applied.
The Court rejected all of these arguments. Respecting the first, it
said:
"It is now claimed that plaintiff, which stands in the shoes
of Seaman, is not entitled to be indemnified under this contract
for any injuries to which Seaman's actual default proximately
contributed. We do not consider the contention to be sound.
If the indemnity (contract) is to mean anything, it must include
situations in which Seaman has sustained a liability by reason
of the building operations. It may very well be that if the injuries had arisen solely out of Seaman's default in some respect,
and were not in any way attributable to Worden, there would
be no liability under the indemnity agreement. Here, however,
the active negligence was that of Worden. Liability of Seaman
was predicated upon a failure to furnish a safe place of employment, and there was a default in this respect only because of
Worden's operations on the premises. In point of fact,
the
43
premises were only unsafe as to Worden's employees.
The Court went on to say:
"Upon the former appeal liability of Seaman was grounded
by this court on the fact that Seaman remained in possession of
the premises, and under these circumstances it could not delegate either to Permanent or Worden its duties under the safeplace statute. It appears to us that the liability of Seaman here
is precisely the sort that was contemplated under the indemnity
contract, and that to hold that it is not is to render the indemnity
meaningless. The indemnity contract presupposes44 a liability
by Seaman to employees, frequenters, and others.1
Further, the Court pointed out:
"We have been able to discover no situation in which the
indemnity contract would have any meaning or purpose if it
40 Supra, note 37, at p. 127 of 238 Wis.
4'Ibid., at p. 129.
42 Other contentions of Worden, not material here. will not be reviewed in this
article.
4 Supra, note 37, at p. 129 of 238 Wis.
44 Ibid.
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were not to cover such a default by Seaman as is here involved.
As we have heretofore suggested, it may be that the contract
does not cover cases in which the sole proximate cause of the
injuries resulting in Seaman's liability were defaults on the part
of Seaman wholly uncontributed to by Worden. A strong argument can be made to the effect that such a case is not covered
by the indemnity, but we need not decide this
question because
45
it is not here under the facts of this case.

After quickly disposing of the public policy argument, 46 the Court
held that, even if Hartford and Worden were, prior to Criswell's
injury, co-sureties (a point which it did not decide) still Worden became principal surety as to the particular facts of the case and was
47
obliged to respond in indemnity.
The Court's decision was founded upon the distinction between
active and passive negligence. Seaman was only passively negligent
in failing to take additional precautions against the type of injury
which Criswell sustained, such passive negligence being founded upon
the non-delegable character of its duties under the Statute. Worden,
on the other hand, was actively negligent in the manner in which it
operated the boom. Under these circumstances, the contract of indemnity may be applied. It is not limited to situations where the
owner is completely without actual fault, nor is it limited only to situ45Ibid., at p. 130 of 238 Wis.
46The Court said, at p. 131 of 238 Wis.: "It is also suggested that it would be
contrary to public policy to extend the clause of this type to include indemnity
for violation of the safe-place statute because it would tend to discourage the
discharge of Seaman's duties in that respect. It may well be that Seaman
could not contract with members of the general public and employees of Worden that it would not be liable for its own failure to maintain a safe place for
frequenters and employees. That is not what it did, however. It simply purchased insurance from plaintiff and exacted an indemnity contract from defendant, the latter to cover cases where defendant's default contributed actively to Seaman's liability. If there were anything to defendant's contention,
automobile and public-liability insurance policies would be void."
-17Ibid., at p. 132 of 238 Wis.: "It is next contended that plaintiff and defendant
are at most coinsurers or cosureties, and that plaintiff's right is to contribution
and not to indemnity. Cosuretyship is the relation between two or more sureties who are bound to answer for the same duty of the principal and who as
between themselves should share the loss caused by the default of the principal.
Restatement, Security, Proposed Final Draft, ch. 6, §141. The relation of coinsurers is upon about the same basis. The rule of contribution is an equitable
rule and is based on the fact that those who insure or become sureties for the
same duty ought to share the results of the default. Where, however, by reason of the agreement between the sureties or by reason of the general equities
of the situation one surety or insurer ought, as against other sureties or insurers, to bear the whole loss, he becomes the principal surety, and all the
other insurers or sureties become subinsurers or subsureties. Restatement,
Security, Proposed Final Draft, ch. 6, §141A. That is the situation here.
Plaintiff merely insured Seaman against its liabilities under the safe-place
statute. Worden insured Seaman against all liabilities sustained by it and contributed to by a breach of duty on the part of Worden. As between Worden
and plaintiff, waiving all questions whether they were otherwise cosureties or
coinsurers, Worden clearly ought to respond in indemnity rather than contribution."
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ations where the owner's liability is sustained on an agency theory,
or as owner under an uninsured contractor.48
Thus the Court has held that indemnity may be had in a situation
where the indemnitee is not wholly without fault, if there is an express
contract of indemnity and if the indemnitee's negligence is merely
passive, or consists in omissions, while the indemnitor's conduct, on
the other hand, is actively negligent.
The Hartford case has far from settled the problem arising under
express contracts of indemnity. This is true because the Court founded
its decision upon the difference between active and passive negligence,
and between liability imposed as a result of actual fault and liability
imposed under the Safe Place Statute without regard to fault and
arising out of non-delegable duties.
Since the Hartford case has suggested that perhaps an indemnity
contract can not be applied under certain circumstances, it is necessary
to examine all of the possible fact situations which may be the subject
of actions upon express indemnity contracts. These fact situations,
using the classification set up by the Court in the Hartford case, are
as follows:
1. The person from whom indemnity is sought may be actively
negligent and the person seeking indemnity may be wholly without
actual fault but may sustain his liability under the Safe Place Statute
as a result of non-delegable duties.
2. The person from whom indemnity is sought may be actively
negligent, and the person seeking indemnity may be passively negligent.
3. The person from whom indemnity is sought may be actively
negligent, and the person seeking indemnity may also be actively negligent.
4. The person from whom indemnity is sought may be only passively negligent, and the person seeking indemnity may be actively
negligent.
5. The person from whom indemnity is sought may sustain liability without actual fault, and the person seeking indemnity may be
actively negligent.
We need not be concerned with the first of these possible fact
situations because they were disposed of by the Hartford decision. The
second is precisely the fact situation of the Hartford case, and in the
first the indemnitee's degree of culpability is even less than nonfeasance, so that we may safely assume that the Hartford decision
would apply also to a situation where the indemnitee's only liability
48 Ibid., at p. 129 et seq. of 238 Wis. Other courts have reached the same result
on similar facts. See Griffiths & Son Co. v. National Fireproofing Co., 210 Ill.
331, 141 N.E. 739, 38 A.L.R. 559 (1923) ; Dundar v. Milef Realty Corp., 258
N.Y. 415, 180 N.E. 102 (1932); Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Youngstown Boiler
& Tank Co., 64 F.2d 638 (6th Cir., 1933).
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to the plaintiff was as a result of non-delegable duties. In fact, dicta
in the Hartford decision so indicates.
The third, fourth and fifth situations all present the same problem.
Where the degree of negligence of the indemnitee is as great or greater
than the degree of negligence of the indemnitor, may the indemnitee
recover on an express contract of indemnity despite his own guilt?
Is it against public policy to give effect to an agreement which will
relieve one party of liability for his own negligent acts?
Indemnity agreements are not per se invalid as against public
policy.49 This principle appears to be recognized in all jurisdictions.50
Thus, every case must be examined to ascertain whether the facts permit an application of the agreement to determine the rights of the
parties.
In the Washington case of Griffiths v. Broderick,51 the plaintiff
commenced an action to recover indemnity from the defendant corporation. It appeared that the plaintiff engaged the defendant to manage
his apartment building, executing a written contract which, among
other things, provided that the plaintiff would "save and hold Henry
Broderick, Inc., harmless of and from any and all loss, damage or
injury to any person or persons whatsoever, or property, arising from
any cause or for any reason whatsoever in or upon said premises."
A tenant was injured in the building as a result of the defendant
Broderick allowing a stairway to become out of repair. The tenant
commenced an action against and recovered a judgment against the
plaintiff owner, who then sought indemnity from Broderick, Inc.
Broderick defended on the ground that the plaintiff, under the contract, had agreed to hold harmless from all liability, and that this
included liability arising from Broderick's own negligence and that,
consequently, the plaintiff could not recover. The plaintiff contended
that the indemnity agreement was void as against public policy when
applied to a situation where the indemnitee sought to recover on the
contract for loss incurred on account of its own negligence. The
argument raised against the proposition of indemnity against one's
own negligence was that such agreements would tend to encourage
negligent conduct inasmuch as a person would not be ultimately responsible for the consequences of his negligent acts, although his liability to the principal party remained.
The Court agreed with the defendant, and held that there was no
rule of public policy which forbade a person from contracting against
liability for his own negligence. To so hold, the Court pointed out,
would render invalid all contracts of indemnity insurance.
49 Hartford
50

Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., supra, note 37.
Annotation, 175 A.L.R. 8, 25 (1948).
127 Wash.2d 901, 182 P.2d 18, 175 A.L.R. 1 (1947).

1957]

SAFE PLACE STATUTE

The facts respecting the cause of the tenant's injuries are not
completely stated in the opinion and it is, therefore, difficult to classify
this case in terms of active and passive negligence. However, even
if we assume that the negligent conduct of Broderick was merely
passive, it would appear that the case is authority for the proposition
that an indemnity agreement is effective, even where the degree of
culpability of the indemnitee is greater than that of the indemnitor.
This is true because it appears that the indemnitor sustained purely a
constructive liability, as owner, to the injured party.
A case squarely holding that a person may agree to indemnify
another against all active negligence is Northern Pacific R. Co. v.
Thornton Brothers Co.52 In that case a sanitary district procured an
easement across a railway right of way to construct a sewer. In
letting the contract to the defendant, Thornton Brothers Co., it procured an indemnity agreement whereby the defendant agreed to indemnify the railway company against all loss or damage "arising in
any manner out of or in any manner connected with" the work. Subsequently, a pile driver owned by a sub-contractor under the defendant,
Thornton, was damaged through the negligence of the railway company in the operation of a train. The railway paid damages to the
sub-contractor and sued the defendant contractor for indemnity. The
Minnesota court held that the railway company could recover indemnity from the contractor under the agreement.
Most courts which have considered the problem have held that
a person may properly contract to indemnify himself against his own
active negligence.53 Cases holding such agreements valid generally
base their conclusion on reasoning such as that of the Missouri court
in Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Ralston-Purina Co.,5 4 where the following is said:
"As to whether an indemnitee can recover for losses caused
by his own negligence depends on the language of the indemnity
contract and what may be termed the subject matter thereof.
A contract which undertakes to indemnify against the consequences of an act which is illegal, because against positive law
or public policy, is void, . . . but it is not contrary to any
positive law or public policy for an indemnitee to contract with
52 206 Minn. 193, 288 N.W. 226 (1939).
53

Westinghouse, C.K. & Co. v. Long Island R. Co., 160 App.Div. 200, 145 N.Y.Supp.
201 (1914), aff'd 216 N.Y. 697, 100 N.E. 1051 (1915) ; Ford v. Stevens Motor
Car Co., 203 Mo.App. 669, 220 S.W. 980 (1920); Payne v. National Transit
Co., 300 Fed. 411 (D.C.Pa., 1924), aff'd. 6 F.2d 729 (3rd Cir., 1925), cert.den.,
269 U.S. 579 (1925); J. W. Grady Co. v. Herrick, 288 Mass. 304, 192 N.E. 738
(1934) ; Clark v. Ames, 267 Mass. 44, 165 N.E. 696 (1929) ; Northern Pacific R.
Co. v. Thornton Bros. Co., supra, note 52; Griffiths v. Broderick, supra, note
51: Terminal Railroad Assn. v. Ralston-Purina Co., 352 Mo. 1013, 180 S.W.2d

693 (1944).

54 Supra, note 53.
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an indemnitor to save him harmless as to third persons, even
though the loss sustained was the result of his own negligence."
The distinction, of course, is between mere negligence, though
in the field of malfeasance, and wilful tortious conduct. It is also
pointed out in the cases that it is not an objection to the validity of
such agreements that they insure against a wrongful act, because they
do not contemplate the commission of such act, they merely provide
against the contingency of such an act happening through negligence
and not by design."
Those courts adopting a contrary view do so on the theory that
it is against public policy for one to secure an agreement whereby he
is indemnified against the results of his own negligence. In Johnson
v. Richmond & D. R. Co.,56 where the facts were identical to those in
the Northern Pacific case, the court reached an opposite conclusion
and denied indemnity to the railway company. The court said:
"It would be strange indeed if such a doctrine (of indemnity
for one's own active negligence) could be maintained. To uphold the stipulation in question would be to hold that it was
competent for one party to put the other parties to the contract
at the mercy of its own misconduct, which can never be lawfully done where an enlightened system of jurisprudence prevails. Public policy forbids it, and contracts against public
policy are void."
The immediate objection which comes to mind upon a reading of
this Virginia decision is that such a view would render invalid all
contracts of indemnity insurance. In fact, it would seem that if indemnity insurance contracts are to be given validity, then other indemnity agreements whereby the indemnitee secures protection against
his own active negligence must be given effect.
The Wisconsin Court has never had occasion to rule on this question. It has, however, ruled that indemnity insurance contracts are
not void as against public policy on the theory that they encourage
negligent conduct by relieving the actor of personal liability. 57

Our

Court has inferred, however, in the Hartford case, "8 that perhaps an
indemnity agreement could not be given effect where the negligence of
the indemnitee was active and that of the indemnitor merely passive.
As has been pointed out, that statement of the Court was dicta only,
but it should be borne in mind in any attempt to determine what the
Court might do should a case come before it.
Despite this dicta, it is felt by this writer that if a case comes to the
Court, it will be inclined to adopt the majority rule and give validity
55 John Griffiths & Son v. National Fireproofing Co., supra, note 48.
56 86Va.975, 11 S.E. 829 (1890).
57 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., supra, note 37.

5Slbid.
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to the contract. Any other result, it is submitted, necessarily is based
upon the proposition that it is against public policy to insure against
one's own negligence. Such a proposition is today untenable, although
it may have had some validity prior to the advent of indemnity and
casualty insurance.
If indemnity agreements of this kind are to be given effect on this
ground, then one further question arises, to wit: Are such contracts
not in fact insurance contracts entered into with an indemnitor not
licensed in that business, and therefore void?
Insurance carriers must, of course, be licensed. 59 The Wisconsin
Court has said:
"An insurance contract is a contract whereby one party
agrees to wholly or partially indemnify the other for loss or
damage which he may suffer from a specified peril. " G
This is the general definition of an insurance contract accepted and
recognized everywhere. 61 Manifestly, that which is a contract of
insurance cannot be changed into something else by merely giving
62
it another name.
No case has been found anywhere discussing whether an indemnity agreement between, for instance an owner and a contractor, whereby the indemnitor agreed to indemnify the indemnitee against the
latter's own active negligence, was in fact an insurance contract, and
void because the indemnitor was not licensed.
The Wisconsin Court's definition of an insurance contract does
not include a proviso that the indemnitor must be one who holds himself out and engages in the business of writing indemnity agreements.
Under it anyone who undertook to indemnify another against some
specified loss would be engaged in the insurance business. However,
it should be remembered that in the Shakman case 63 wherein the definition was set forth, the Court was not faced with this problem, and
further that, while the WISCONSIN STATUTES regulate insurance, they
do not define it.64 Likewise the basis of the regulation is that the
general public has an interest in the proper control of the business of
writing insurance policies,6 5 as a matter of the police power. The
Ch. 201-207.
Shakman v. United States Credit System Co., 92 Wis. 366, 66 N.W. 528, 32

59 Wis. STATS. (1955),

60

L.R.A. 383, 53 Am.St.Rep. 920 (1896).

6129 Am. JUR., INsURANcE, §3.

62 State ex rel. Martin v. Dane County Mutual Benefit Assn., 247 Wis. 220, 19
N.W.2d 303 (1944).
63 Supra, note 60.
64 State ex rel. Martin v. Dane County Mutual Benefit Assn., supra,note 62.

65 State ex rel. United States F. & G. Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 309, 199 N.W. 954
(1924); State ex rel. Time Insurance Co. v. Smith, 184 Wis. 455, 200 N.W. 65
(1924); Hobbins v. Hannah, 186 Wis. 283, 202 N.W. 800 (1925) ; State ex rel,
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Fowler, 196 Wis. 451, 220 N.W. 534 (1928).
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public interest is not in the incidental execution of an indemnity agreement as part of a general business contract.
Thus appears the distinction which it seems must be made in these
cases. It appears only proper that if A, having no relation to the activities of B, agrees to indemnify B against his own negligent acts, and
further enters into similar agreements with others, he should procure
a license so to do, for he is engaged in the business of writing insurance. If A, however, is a building contractor and B engages him to
build a house, exacting, as part of the contract for the erection of the
house, an indemnity agreement an entirely different situation is presented. Indeed, it is to be doubted if the police power of the state
could extend to such a contractual arrangement.66
Before leaving the subject of express indemnity agreements, it is
well to note that all of the above proceeds on the assumption that the
terms of the indemnity agreement are sufficient to include such things
as the indemnitee's own negligence, or his own active negligence.
Without a sufficiently specific agreement, of course, there is no basis
67
for recovery against the indemnitor
B. IMPLIED IN LAW OR QUASI-CONTRACTS
In General. The quasi-contractual phase of the problem under
consideration is perhaps the more difficult. It is equally important
because the number of cases where the parties fail to spell out their
rights and duties by means of express indemnity agreements are
numerous.
In the law of express indemnity agreements, a party who agrees
to indemnify another against a certain loss will, in most jurisdictions,
be held to the bargain he has made, even if it results in his having
to indemnify the other against his own active negligence. The fundamental difference between these and indemnity contracts implied in
law is that in the latter situation the obligation of the indemnitor, as
has been seen, is imposed by the law to prevent unjust enrichment.6s
Assent to be bound is not the test; rather the question is whether the
indemnitee has conferred a benefit upon the indemnitor, which has
been appreciated, accepted and retained by the latter under such circumstances that he would be unjustly enriched if he did not respond
in damages to the indemnitee to the extent of the benefit conferred.6 9
Insofar as the subject under consideration is concerned, the classic
6

It is, of course, not within the scope of this article to discuss the limits of the
police power. It should suffice to point out the axiom that the police power

67

See Finkelstein v. Brant, 198 Wis. 527, 224 N.W. 743 (1929). Also, see the
text of the indemnity agreement in the Hartford case, quoted supra, note 40,
and the indemnity agreement in Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Thornton Bros.
Co., supra, note 52.
Supra, notes 30 through 36.
Supra, note 36.

extends to those matters affecting public health, safety, morals or welfare.

68
69
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situation of quasi-contractual indemnity is the case where an owner of
premises is liable to a frequenter because his duties under the Safe
Place Statute are non-delegable, but where the injuries sustained by
the frequenter were in fact caused by the negligence of a contractor
working on the premises, from whom the owner failed to secure a
written indemnity agreement.
Availability of Quasi-Contractual Relief. As indicated above,
the only Wisconsin case pertaining to the entire problem of indemnity
under the Safe Place Statute is Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.
v. Worden-Allen Co.,7 0 involving an express contract.

Dicta in that

case, however, sheds some light on the disposition of the Court toward
quasi-contractual indemnity cases. In discussing the express contract
the Court said:
"....

the first (contention) is that it (the indemnity agreement)

may have been intended to cover liability arising out of nondelegable duties, where in fact the fault was wholly that of
Worden, but because of the non-delegable character of the duty
Seaman would sustain a liability without actual fault. In such a
situation, however, there would be no need for an indemnity
contract because Seaman would be entitled without it to complete
indemnity from Worden. Zulkee v. Wing, 20 Wis. *408."
(emphasis added)
Thus the Court points out that where the indenmitee has sustained a
liability without actual fault the express contract is unnecessary and
indemnity may be had purely as a matter of quasi-contract. Cited in
support of that proposition is Zulkee v. Wing,71 an 1866 case holding
that a master may have indemnity from his servant on account of
damages paid by the master as a result of the servant's negligence.
The only other Wisconsin case discussing the question is City of Milwaukee v. Boynton Cab Co.,72 where the Court in dicta said that quasi-

contractual indemnity might be had by one who sustained liability
without any fault against the actual tortfeasor.
While these statements of the Court are dicta, there is no reason
to suppose that they would not be held to be the law should a case be
brought before the Court. In every case where one completely innocent
is required to respond for the tort of another, all of the conditions
70 Supra, note 37.

7120 Wis. *408 (1866).
72201 Wis. 581, 229 N.W. 28 (1930). In this case, an employee of the plaintiff
city was killed as a result of the negligence of the defendant in the operation
of a motor vehicle. The city was in no respect negligent, but was obliged to
pay workmen's compensation benefits. Thus subrogated under the provisions
of Wis. STATS., §102.29, the city sued the defendant. While recovery was allowed because of the statutory grant of a cause of action to the city under Sec.
102.29, the Court pointed out in dicta that the city would have enjoyed a common law right of indemnity, as a matter of quasi-contract had the statutory
right not been conferred.
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of quasi-contractual recovery as set forth above are met.7 3 Perhaps the
only clearer case is where the alleged indemnitee is guilty of active
negligence and the alleged indemnitor sustains liability without actual
fault. While most jurisdictions would give effect to a written agreement under these circumstances, it is obvious that no quasi-contractual
relief is available for the simple reason that there is no unjust enrichment.
The real problem arises in cases where the indemnitee has been
guilty of some omission, some passive negligence, and the indemnitor
was actively negligent. Under these circumstances, is there any quasicontractual relief ?
Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdictions, it is the purpose
of this paper to explore the problem under the Wisconsin Safe Place
Statute, and it is the opinion of this writer that, to a large extent, this
question is answered by the Wisconsin doctrine of contribution among
joint tortfeasors. Most jurisdictions embrace the old common law
rule that contribution will not lie between joint tortfeasors.7 4 In Wisconsin, since the 1918 decision in Ellis v. Chicago and North Western
Ry. Co.,75 we have established a rule of contribution among joint tort-

feasors. In that case, the plaintiff's injuries were caused in a collision
between a railway train and an interurban car, the negligence of the
railway company and the traction company concurring to produce the
result. The Court held that the rule against contribution between joint
wrongdoers did not apply to a case where there was no wilful or conscious wrong, and that contribution would lie as between joint tortfeasors guilty of ordinary negligence.
7
In the leading case of Wait v. Pierce
1 the Court set forth the
basis of the right to contribution, and stated:
"The right of contribution is founded upon principles of
equity and natural justice and does not spring from contract.
Whether the common obligation be imposed by contract or
grow out of tort, the thing that gives rise to the right of contribution is that one of the common obligors has discharged
more than his fair and equitable share of the common liability."
Since these decisions, the doctrine of contribution has become
firmly fixed in our jurisprudence. Contribution is available to a
joint tortfeasor who sustains a common liability for negligence with
another joint tortfeasor and who has discharged more than his fair
73Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Northwest Airlines, 94 F.Supp. 620 (D.C.Wis.,
1950).
74The leading case adopting this rule is Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. &

Q. R. Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905).

167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
76191 Wis. 202, 210 N.W. 822, 48 A.L.R. 276 (1926).
75
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share of the obligation.7 7 In the case of two such tortfeasors, 50%
of the total liability to the plaintiff is a fair and equitable share, regardless of the comparative negligence of the parties."" The right to
contribution is inchoate until one of two joint tortfeasors pays more
than his fair share, at which time the right vests.79 Wilful misconduct
includes gross negligence, and a grossly negligent tortfeasor may not
have contribution. s
In almost forty years of litigation since the Ellis case"' no Wisconsin decision has ever intimated that the rules of contribution were in
any wise affected by the character of the ordinary negligence of the
parties. In other words, whether the negligence of the joint tortfeasors be active or passive, contribution will lie. That the Wisconsin
Supreme Court would alter this firmly established doctrine is most
improbable.
It therefore appears that indemnity, as a matter of quasi-contract,
will not lie in favor of a passively negligent joint tortfeasor against
an actively negligent joint tortfeasor, for to allow such recovery would
destroy the doctrine of contribution which obtains in this state.
What happens, however, if one or more of the conditions of contribution liability are not present? As we have seen, the doctrine of
contribution depends upon the existence of the relationship of joint
tortfeasors, which in turn depends upon "concurring negligence" and
common liability to the plaintiff.8 2 Further the element of wilful
8
wrongdoing must be absent.

3

At the outset, let us eliminate the proposition of a case where the
negligence of the parties did not "concur" to produce plaintiff's injuries. It is difficult to imagine a safe place case involving passive
and active negligence where such a problem would be presented. This
is true because the passive omission of one party would be a continuing
negligent act which would combine with the other's active negligence
to cause the injury. This proposition has been recognized by our Court
in Pennell v. Rumely Products Co. s 4 It was pointed out in that case

that in order for the continuing omission not to concur with the active
negligence to create the joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors,
Ellis v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., supra, note 75; Wait v. Pierce, supra,note 76;
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934);
78 Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 75, 35 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
Zurn v. Whatley, 213 Wis. 365, 251 N.W. 435 (1933); Homerding v. Pospychalla, 228 Wis. 606, 280 N.W. 409 (1938).
77

7 Michel v. McKenna, 199 Wis. 608, 227 N.W. 396 (1929) ; De Brue v. Frank,
213 Wis. 280, 251 N.W. 494 (1933) ; Ainsworth v. Berg, supra, note 77.
80 Zurn v. Whatley, supra, note 78.
81 Supra, note 75.
82 See cases cited supra, notes 75 through 80. Also see Noll v. Nugent, 214 Wis.

204, 252 N.W. 574 (1934).
s3 Supra, note 80.
84 159 Wis. 195, 149 N.W. 769 (1914).
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the active negligence would have to constitute a superseding cause,
destroying proximate causation between the omission and the injury.
Thus this problem is really a problem in the field of proximate cause,
and the passively negligent party, if successful, prevails against the
plaintiff, and no indemnity question arises.
Turning to gross negligence, there is likewise no case in Wisconsin
on the question of whether an ordinarily negligent tortfeasor may have
indemnity from a grossly negligent one. The question is one of frequent speculation among lawyers, and does pose a serious question. As
set forth above, 5 the right to quasi-contractual indemnity is generally
stated to be conditioned upon the freedom of the indemnitee from
wrongful conduct."6 On the other hand, Wisconsin has rejected the
concept that the wrongful conduct of a joint tortfeasor should bar his
8
recovery of contribution if he is guilty of no wilful misconduct

7

Could this policy not be extended to the field of indemnity? The
answer, of course, lies with our Court, and, because of the infrequency
of gross negligence cases under the Safe Place Statute, we will merely
pose the question and pass to the real problem which is often encountered when, as between two persons liable under the Statute, the
relationship of joint tortfeasors does not exist.
That problem is the problem arising when there is no common
liability between the two. It arises where the alleged indemnitor is the
employer of the plaintiff who has sued the indemnitee.
Problem where Plaintiff is Employee of Indemnitor. Let us
suppose that A is the employee of B, an independent contractor engaged by C to work on C's premises. A is injured as a result of the
negligence of B, his employer, under such circumstances that B becomes liable to A for the payment of workmen's compensation benefits.
C has retained the necessary custody and control of his premises to
become chargeable with the non-delegable duties of the Safe Place
Statute. B, through his compensation carrier, pays benefits to A. A
then joins with B's carrier in a "third party action" under the Workmen's Compensation Act8s against C, alleging that the injuries of A
were caused by C's violation of the Safe Place Statute. No express
85 See discussion, supra, on the nature of indemnity.
86 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION,

§76.

87 See cases cited supra, notes 75 through 80.
SS WIs. STATS. (1955), §102.29 provides as follows: "The making of a claim for
compensation against an employer or compensation insurer for the injury or
death of an employee shall not affect the right of the employee, his personal
representative or other person entitled to bring action, to make claim or
maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or death, . ..
The employer or compensation insurer who shall have paid or is obligated to
pay a lawful claim under this chapter shall likewise have the right to make
claim or maintain an action in tort against any other party for such injury or

death .. "
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indemnity agreement exists between B and C. C impleads B in the
action and files a cross-complaint for indemnity against B.
This is not at all an infrequent situation and it raises what is perhaps one of the most difficult problems of indemnity under the Safe
Place Statute. The issue is whether or not C, the owner, may have
indemnity on a quasi-contract theory against B, the contractor and
employer of A, despite the following provision in the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act:
"When such conditions (of liability for compensation under
the Act) exist, the right to recovery of compensation pursuant
to the provisions of this chapter shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer."8' 9
In the leading case of Britt v. Buggs,90 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that where the plaintiff in a third party action against a
third party defendant, who impleaded the plaintiff's employer and
cross-complained for contribution, received workmen's compensation
under the Act, the third party could not enforce contribution from
the employer. The Court pointed out that the right to contribution
arises only where there is a common liability to the plaintiff and
where the relationship of joint tortfeasors exists between the parties.
The court said:
"It will be seen that Buggs having been subjected to the liability of the compensation act, such liability was in lieu of any
other liability whatsoever. Hence Buggs completely relieved
himself from liability to Britt on account of the collision when
he paid compensation pursuant to the compensation act. That
being so, there was no common liability to Britt for such accident by Buggs and Wolff (the third party). . .. "91
It is, therefore, clear that no contribution may be had from the
plaintiff's employer in a case where the only liability of the employer
arises under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Consequently, an
owner may not recover contribution from an independent contractor
whose employee has been injured on the job and who has commenced
a third party action against the owner under the Safe Place Statute.
But, may the owner secure indemnity on a quasi-contractual theory ?92
It goes without saying that the employer has not agreed voluntarily
and expressly to assume liabilities beyond his compensation liability.
89 Wis. STATS.

90201 Wis.
91 Ibid.
92

(1955), §102.03(2).

533, 230 N.W. 621 (1930).

Of course, no problem is presented where there is an express indemnity agreement. It must be remembered that in the Hartford case, supra, note 37, Hartford, standing in the shoes of the owner, was allowed indemnity from Worden,
the plaintiff's employer, under an express contract. The right to indemnity
arises from the contract, and there is nothing in the Workmen's Compensation
Law to prevent an employer from enlarging his liability by express agreement
voluntarily entered into.
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It should also be kept in mind that the doctrine of Britt v. Buggs9cannot be applied as the complete solution to the indemnity problem,
because that case decided only that contribution could not be had; this
for the reason that no common liability existed between the parties.
As we have seen, the law of quasi-contractual indemnity contains no
such condition of relief. The question, of course, is whether the owner
has been
has conferred a benefit upon the indemnitor-employer which
94
accepted and retained by him, to his unjust enrichment.
It is not enough to point to the general doctrine discussed above 99
that one who, without fault, has discharged the tort liability of another
is entitled to indemnity. In the first place, compensation liability is
not a tort liability, nor is it a contract liability; it is purely a statutory
liability. 96 In the second place, the employer has paid a limited amount
of compensation according to the schedules of the Act, whereas the
third party case against the owner is for the recovery, by the compensation carrier, of that amount, plus an unlimited amount by the employee for his pain and suffering. 97 It may be conceded that, merely
on the general principles of indemnity, the owner should be able to
recover from the employer indemnification for that portion of the
third party claim which represents the subrogated interest of the insurance carrier, because that is a liability which, as between the owner
and the employer, should be borne by the latter.98 That is a defense,
however, which may be asserted by way of affirmative defense against
the insurance carrier, which, as subrogated to the rights of the employer, 99 stands in the employer's shoes. The real problem is with the
balance of the claim; the employee's action for pain and suffering.
It is at first difficult to see how the payment by the owner to the
employee could confer a benefit upon the employer. This is true because the employer sustains no liability beyond his compensation
liability, and is not liable to his employee for pain and suffering. 0 0
How then does he derive a benefit from the owner's payment to the
employee? The situation is manifestly different from a case where
an ordinary frequenter, to whom the alleged indemnitor would be
liable to an unlimited amount for pain and suffering, sues the owner.
If it is assumed that the indemnitee must discharge an existing
legal liability of the indemnitor to the plaintiff, then the conclusion
9 Supra. note 90.
94 See discussion supra as to nature of indemnity.
95 Supra, notes 70 through 73.
96 Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 169 Wis. 106, 170 N.W. 275, 171 N.W. 935,
173 N.W. 257 (1919).
97 WIS. STATS. (1955), §102.29.
98 Supra, notes 70 through 73; see also general discussion of nature of indemnity,
supra.

(1955), §102.29.
WIS. STATS. (1955), Ch. 102; Britt v. Buggs, supra, note 90.

99 WIS. STATS.
'00
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seems inescapable that there is no cause of action in indemnity in
this situation, for lack of a benefit conferred.
Despite this seeming impasse, several courts in other jurisdictions
have concluded that, under these circumstances, the "exclusive remedy"
provisions of the compensation acts do not bar quasi-contractual indemnity actions. 10 1 None of these cases discuss the problem here
raised. Each bases its decision on the proposition that indemnity, unlike contribution, does not depend upon the existence of a joint tortfeasor relationship.102 The courts faced with the problem seem to think
this distinction sufficient to allow the recovery of indemnity.
That there should be no indemnity in a situation of this kind
seems indeed unjust. An owner, who is perhaps guilty of no negligence at all, is, because of the non-delegable duties of the Safe Place
Statute, subjected to liability far in excess of workmen's compensation benefits, for an injury which is actually caused by the negligence
of the contractor, and which should be a matter wholly between the
contractor and his employee. Yet it clearly appears that no benefit,
in the sense of discharging a legal obligation of the employer to his
employee, is conferred.
Must the benefit be in that category, however? It is submitted
that a different type of benefit is conferred in these cases which will
support quasi-contractual relief. The contractor-employer has, or will,
receive from the owner a stipulated sum for performance of the
work in question. If the owner is obliged to pay this sum, and at the
same time respond in damages to the employees of the contractor
injured as a result of the contractor's own negligence, and his consequent failure to perform his work in a workmanlike and non-negligent
manner, then the owner has most certainly conferred a benefit upon
the contractor though not in the sense of discharging his legal obligations to his employee.
It is settled that a contractor impliedly undertakes, in entering
into a contract with an owner, that the work will be done in a workmanlike and non-negligent manner, and with such skill as may ordi01

Burris v. American Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir., 1941) ; American District Telephone Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir., 1950); McFall v.

Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E2d 463 (1952).

102 For instance, in the American District Telephone case, supra, note 101, the

court said: "The difficult question in this case arises on the trial court's action

in dismissing the third party complaint. It is important to note that the third
party complaint did not state an action for contribution, but an action for in-

demnity, for judgment over against Armour in favor of American, on the

allegation that Armour was guilty of primary negligence resulting in the injury of Kittleson and that American's negligence contributing to the injury of
Kittleson was secondary." The Court held that the telephone company "had the
right to maintain a third party complaint against Armour & Company for in-

demnity over objections of Armour Company that the right to indemnity was
so repugnant to the Compensation Act that survival of the right would prevent realization of the purpose of the Act"
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narily be expected from those who undertake such work. 1°3 While
this covenant is ordinarily applied to the condition of the work performed, and as a defense in an action for the price, there should be no
reason why it cannot be applied in these cases. Certainly it is as much
a breach of the promise if the contractor performs his work so improperly and negligently as to expose the owner to thousands of dollars
of liability for personal injuries as it is a breach if the finished work,
because poorly built, is worth a few hundred dollars less.
While no case has been found on this point, it is submitted that
the above is a solution to this facet of the problem of indemnity under
the Safe Place Statute where the owner's liability is purely based upon
the non-delegable duties of the Statute. It is in accord with the rules
of quasi-contractual indemnity, and at the same time it does no violence
to the concept of non-delegable duties or to the "exclusive remedy"
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 0 4
However, where the owner is guilty of passive negligence, it is
doubtful if this rationale can be applied to the case, for in such a situation the owner's liability is not incurred solely as a result of the breach
by the contractor of the implied promise to do the work in a workmanlike and non-negligent manner. Here the same problem arises as
arose in the gross negligence matter discussed above, namely, whether
the Court will adopt, in indemnity cases, the rule of contribution cases
that mere ordinary negligence does not bar quasi-contractual relief.
This problem, however, is more difficult in that one is confronted with
the finding of a benefit conferred on the employer-contractor guilty
of active negligence. But if the Court is to consider the active negligence of the contractor as a breach of the implied covenant, then undoubtedly the owner is entitled to some measure of relief as a matter
of defense in an action for the price of the work. However, the rule
above proposed should be available in most cases, since the owner does
not usually participate even passively in cases where an employee of the
contractor is injured through some active negligence of the contractor.
V.

A.

COROLLARY PROBLEMS
INSURANCE COVERAGE

One of the problems closely related to the matter of indemnity
under the Safe Place Statute is the problem of whether insurance coverage is available to a party sued for indemnity under the standard type
103

Butler v. Davis, 119 Wis. 166, 96 N.W. 561 (1903) ; Burmeister v. Wolfgram,

175 Wis. 506, 185 N.W. 517 (1921); Geiger v. Ajax Rubber Co., 190 N.W. 831

104

(1922) ; Charles v. Umentum, 261 Wis. 647, 53 N.W.2d 706 (1952).
The contractor's liability is not enlarged beyond that set forth in the Workmen's Compensation Act, Wis. STATS. (1955), §102.03(2), except insofar as
he consents thereto by undertaking the work and entering into an agreement
with the owner whereby he impliedly agrees to do a workmanlike job. That
voluntary enlargement of such obligation is proper is held in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., supra,note 37.
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of public liability insurance policy. This problem arises because practically all public liability policies contain an exclusion to the effect that
the policy does not apply "to liability assumed by the insured under
any contract or agreement." 10 5 The question of coverage is immediately apparent and, of course, the issue is whether or not the insured
indemnitor has "assumed" his liability "under any contract or agreement."
In the case of express contracts of indemnity it would seem clear
that the above quoted exclusion would relieve the public liability insurer from liability voluntarily incurred by the insured under an express indemnity agreement over and above such liability as the law
might impose. Thus if, by the terms of an express indemnity agreement, an insured agrees to indemnify another against liability for that
other's own negligent acts, it would appear that the exclusion would be
effective. While there is no Wisconsin law on the subject, it is obvious
that any other result would nullify the specific provision of the insurance
contract."0 6
However, in a case where an express indemnity agreement exists
but where the insured would be liable for indemnity regardless of the
existence of the written indemnity agreement, then it is difficult to see
how the exclusion could become effective. In this connection the
situation proposed by our Court in Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company v. Worden-Allen Company 0 7 is illustrative of a case of this
type. The Court said in that case that where the indemnitor was
guilty of active negligence and the indemnitee incurred liability without actual fault, as a result of the non-delegable duties of the Safe
Place Statute, that the existence of a written indemnity agreement
was not essential to permit the recovery of indemnity, because the
indemnitor could be required to respond in indemnity as a matter of
quasi-contract. That being so, it is difficult to see how an insurer
which has agreed to insure against liability imposed by law could
escape its obligation under a policy by merely pointing to an express
contract which under the circumstances of the case did not enlarge
the liability of its insured under the facts of a particular case. 08
105 The text of the exclusion is taken from the public liability policy of the Con-

tinental Casualty Co., but other companies use practically the same, if not
identical, language.

106 In this connection it is to be noted that when the provisions of an insurance

policy are clear and unambiguous, the rule of strict construction against insurance companies cannot be resorted to for the purpose of modifying the con-r
tract. Tischendorf v. Lynn Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 190 Wis. 33, 208 N.WA.
917 (1926) ; City Bank of Portage v. Bankers' Ltd. Mutual Cas. Co., 206 Wis.
1, 238 N.W. 819 (1931).
107 Supra, note 37.
108 In a case of this kind, undoubtedly the court would rely upon the well known
rule that, in cases of ambiguity in insurance contracts, such policies should be
construed most strongly against the insurer. See Britten v. Eau Claire, 260
Wis. 382, 51 N.W.2d 31- (1952), and a host of Wisconsin decisions dating
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The most perplexing problem in this matter of insurance coverage
arises when the alleged indemnitor is guilty of active negligence and
the alleged indemnitee is guilty of passive negligence. Under those
circumstances, in the absence of an express indemnity agreement,
it has been pointed out above that the parties are entitled only to contribution, unless some special factor is present which destroys the
relationship of joint tortfeasors. When in such a case the indemnitor
enlarges his liability by an express indemnity agreement, what is the
limit of his insurer's liability? On the one hand it may be said that the
indemnitor has been sued on an express indemnity agreement and not
for contribution and that, therefore, the insurance company should be
permitted to avoid the entire claim under its exclusion. On the other
hand it may be said that the law imposes a contribution liability of
50% upon the indemnitor which could in any event be recovered by
the indemnitee and that, therefore, the indemnitor has increased his
liability by only 50% of the total claim, and the loss should be prorated between the insurer and the insured indemnitor on that basis. 1°9
The former argument may be criticized on the ground that it determines the substantive rights of the parties solely on the basis of the
nature of the indemnitee's action, as upon an express contract, and not
upon the ultimate liability of the parties. The latter argument is subject also to criticism on the ground that the insurer's only liability is
for contribution, and no contribution action exists against the indemnitor. Whatever conclusion the Court may reach no doubt the rule
of strict construction against insurers will play a prominent part.110
It would seem that a problem of insurance coverage does not
exist when the indemnity suit is based entirely upon quasi-contract.
As pointed out above, contracts implied in law are not really contracts at all because the liability is imposed by the law without regard
to the assent of the parties."' They are contracts only by legal fiction.
Since the insurance policy exclusion refers to liability "assumed" by
contract, it would appear that such exclusion should not cover a liability imposed by the law upon a legal fiction of contract. Quite clearly
the policy provision contemplates obligations voluntarily incurred by
the insured in excess of such obligations as the law imposes upon him
regardless of his assent."

2

back to Hinman v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 36 Wis. 159 (1874). But
note Bauman v. Midland Union Ins. Co., 261 Wis. 449, 53 N.W.2d 529 (1952)
where the Court said this rule applies only to the language of the contract and
not to the facts of the case.
109 Clearly the insurer should not be liable for more than the amount which
could have been collected as contribution, for the same reasons as discussed
above.
110 Supra, note 108.
in
Wojahn v. National Union Bank, supra, note 30; Dunnebacke v. Pittman,
supra,note 33; Nelson v. Preston, supra, note 36.
112 The key to the entire situation is the word "assumed." Words in an insurance
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B. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Impleader. The most common practice in cases involving indemnity under the Safe Place Statute is for the indemnitee to implead the indemnitor as a co-defendant in the same action as that
brought against the indemnitee, at the same time serving upon the
indemnitor a cross-complaint seeking indemnification in the event
that the plaintiff recovers against the indemnitee. This practice is
most certainly authorized by the WISCONSIN STATUTES. The impleader statute provides:
"A defendant, who if he be held liable in the action, will thereby obtain a right of action against a person not a party may
apply for an order making
such person a party defendant and
'113
the court may so order.
While it has always been the practice in Milwaukee County to
implead additional defendants by motion or order to show cause
served upon the plaintiff and upon the proposed impleaded defendant,
and to attach thereto a proposed cross-complaint, which the Court
then orders, upon granting the impleader, to stand as and for the
cross-complaint in the action, the practice of securing ex parte impleader without notice has prevailed in some counties in the State.
Thus, it is important to consider the new rule of practice adopted
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and effective September 1, 1956,
which reads as follows:
"Application for an order bringing in an additional party shall
be made by motion or order to show cause supported by affidavit
together with a proposed cross complaint and served on the
plaintiff on or before forty days after the service of the summons and complaint on the applicant. The time limit for the
making of such applications may be extended by the court for
cause either before or after the expiration of said forty days.""' 4
Therefore, it appears that since the amendment of the Court rules
it is imperative that an indemnitee move promptly in seeking to imlead and cross-complain against an indemnitor.
Tender of Defense. Situations may arise where the Court may
deny, for reasons peculiar to the case before it, an impleader motion." 5
Other situations may arise where counsel for the indemnitee may deem
policy should be given their usual and common meaning, unless such would do
violence to the intent of the parties. Charette v. Prudential Insurance Co., 202
Wis. 470, 232 N.W. 848 (1930). Webster defines "assume" as "to take to or
upon one's self," or "to undertake." The word refers to action by the person

"assuming." One does not "assume" quasi-contractual obligations; they are
imposed. Wojahn v. National Union Bank, supra, note 30.
"'3

114
15

Wis. STATS. (1955), §260.19(3).
WIS. STATS. (1955), §260.19(4).
Impleader is in the discretion of the court. Wis. STATS. (1955), §260.19(3);
Wait v. Pierce, supra, note 76.
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it inadvisable to implead a second defendant. He may consider it unwise from the standpoint of the effect multiple defendants would have
damage-wise on the jury, or he may feel that he can secure a dismissal
of the plaintiff's action as a matter of law, or that he may prevail to the
jury against the plaintiff. In the latter situations, of course, he does
not want to risk the taxation of costs by the impleaded defendant
against him, because his cross-complaint, of course, falls if he is not
found liable to the plaintiff.
In cases of this kind it is well to consider a tender of defense
to the alleged indemnitor. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss
at any length the doctrine of tender of defense. An excellent discussion of that practice may be found in a prior article in this Review." 6
Basically, the doctrine of tender of defense is to the effect that
when one party is liable to indemnify another on account of some
matter for which the other has been sued, and he is duly notified of
the pendency of the suit and requested to take upon himself its defense, he is bound by the judgment rendered in the action if the notice
of a tender of defense to him is duly given, whether or not he actually
appears in the action."'
It should be noted that the first requisite of a valid tender of defense is that the tender be timely. It is perhaps well to tender the
defense to the indemnitor before the time for answer has expired.",
This, of course, affords him an opportunity to defend the case from
the very outset. It is also generally conceded that the tender must
include an offer to the indemnitor to give him control of the defense." 9
Since the tender of defense is a common law doctrine and because there is very little Wisconsin law on the subject, it is unquestionably wise to make a prompt and complete tender of the defense
in a formal fashion, in order to be sure that the rights of the indemnitee are sufficiently protected. The importance of this cannot be too
greatly stressed, since a valid tender of defense will bind the indemnitor by the judgment, whereas an invalid tender will not.10 The writer
has used the form appearing in the footnotes"' in tendering the de116 Luck and Klitsner, Tender of Defense, 30 MLARQ. L. REv. 1 (1946).
11 Ibid.
118 Somers v. Schmidt, 24 Wis. 417 (1869).
'1
Supra, note 116; Saveland v. Green, 36 Wis. 612 (1875) ; Adams v. Filer, 7
Wis. 306 (1858) ; Grafton v. Hinkley, 111 '"vVis. 46, 86 N.W. 859 (1901).
120 Supra, note 116; American Candy Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 Wis. 266, 159
N.W. 917 (1916). It is to be noted that under the decision here cited the
estoppel of the judgment binds both indemnitor and indemnitee where there
has been a valid tender.
121 Following is a form of tender of defense, to which copies of the pleading are
attached:
"Please Take Notice: That the defendant
- hereby tenders to you the
defense of the above entitled action now pending in the court aforesaid, in
which is plaintiff and is defendant; that as more particularly
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fense of an action, the same together with copies of all pleadings in
the action, being served upon the indemnitor to whom the defense was
being tendered in the same fashion as a summons. Such a tender of
defense, if timely, should result in the indemnitor being bound by the
judgment and all the issues of negligence and contributory negligence,
so that the only issues to be litigated in a subsequent action against
the indemnitor for indemnity are issues strictly between those parties.
In the complaint in such an action, the indemnitee must allege that a
tender of defense was made and that the tender was proper and
22
timely.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The fact that our Court has had before it but one case involving
indemnity under the Safe Place Statute of course prevents any dogmatic conclusions from the above discussion, if such are ever possible
when one is considering a question which is fundamentally one of
common law.
It is, however, perhaps safe to conclude that, even in view of the
dicta in the oft-cited Hartford case, any express indemnity agreement
sufficient in its terms to cover the case at hand should be given effect,
even though such result relieves the indemnitee of the consequences
of his own misfeasance.
In the field of quasi-contracts, the conclusion is submitted that
indemnity should be available so long as it does not collide with Wisconsin's time honored doctrine of contribution, if the indemnitee is
sufficiently without fault of his own which might bar his recovery.
This should be particularly true where the indemnitor and the plaintiff
are employer and employee, and the indemnitee is left without recourse
unless he can secure indemnity.
It is hoped by the author that this article may be of some help
to Wisconsin attorneys faced with the prospect of charting a course
appears from the summons and complain of the plaintiff and the answer of
the defendant, this action arises out of, etc. (stating nature of action)
"Please Take Further Notice: That the defendant hereby makes
demand upon you to take over the defense of this action and to indemnify and
save him harmless against any liability which might ultimately accrue to him
in said action; that in the event that you decline to accept the defense of this
action, the said defendant shall look to you for indemnification in full on account of any payment which it shall be required to make under any judgment
obtained against it and in favor of the plaintiff herein, and for all the costs,
expenses and attorney fees incurred by the said defendant in the defense of
said action; that you will be bound by the judgment which shall be rendered
in this action; that said defendant hereby offers to surrender to you the complete defense and control of this action.
"Please Take Further Notice: That attached hereto are true and correct
copies of the summons and complaint of the plaintiff and the answer of the
defendant in this action, together with copies of all other papers heretofore
served and filed in this action.
"Dated at, etc."
122 Saveland v. Green, supra, note 119.
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across the as yet uncharted sea which is the problem of indemnity
under the Wisconsin Safe Place Statute. It cannot contain all the
answers, and there are doubtless statements set forth above upon
which there is and will be disagreement, but to the end that it may
contribute to the solving of these problems it is respectfully submitted.

